Fall 2024

Seminar on Mechanism Design

Instructor:

Hu Fu fuhu@mail.shufe.edu.cn
Office: 504 School of Information Management and Engineering
Office Hour: by appointment

Lectures:

Wednesday 10:05-11:45am, 209 Lecture Hall No 3

Prerequisites:

Basics in mechanism design and undergraduate level algorithms will be assumed.

Texts:

There is no required textbook.
Some supplementary readings are occasionally provided here. All readings are optional.

Course Work:

Grades are determined by Problem sets/written assignments (40%) + Attendance (10%) + Final Presentation (50%).

Suggested Papers for Presentation

Homework Policies:

Students are encouraged to form groups of up to three people for each assignment. Each group needs to turn in only one solution, but every group member must be able to explain everything turned in.
No late solutions will be accepted.
Typesetting solutions using LaTex is encouraged.
If you do work with someone outside your group or use some outside source, you must acknowledge them in your write-up.

Problem Sets

Schedule:

Sept 11: Introduction, Combinatorial Auctions, review of the VCG mechanism, Walrasian Tatonnement
- The lovely but lonely Vickrey Auction by Lawrence Ausubel and Paul Milgrom.
Sept 18: Gross subsitute valuations, Walrasian equilibria, welfare theorems
- An algorithmic survey of gross substitutes by Renato Paes Leme. GEB'17
Oct 2: No lecture (National day holiday)
Sept 25: Configuration LP, demand oracles, submodular maximization subject to cardinality constraint
Oct 9: Continuous greedy algorithm for maximizing submodular functions subject to matroid constraints
- Lecture notes on continuous greedy algorithm for submodular maximization subject to matroid constraints by Eric Balkanski.
Oct 16: Myerson's optimal auction.
- My lecture notes on ironing