Seminar on Mechanism Design
- Instructor:
- Hu Fu
fuhu@mail.shufe.edu.cn
Office: 504 School of Information Management and Engineering
Office Hour: by appointment
- Lectures:
- Wednesday 10:05-11:45am, 209 Lecture Hall No 3
- Prerequisites:
-
Basics in mechanism design and undergraduate level algorithms will be assumed.
- Texts:
-
There is no required textbook.
Some supplementary readings are occasionally provided here. All readings are optional.
- Course Work:
-
Grades are determined by Problem sets/written assignments (40%) + Attendance (10%) + Final Presentation (50%).
- Suggested Papers for Presentation
-
-
Do Prices Coordinate Markets?
Hsu, Morgenstern, Rogers, Roth, Vohra. STOC'16
-
Computing Walrasian Equilibria: Fast Algorithms and Structural Properties
Paes Leme, Wong. Math. Program.'20 (SODA'17)
-
On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Equilibrium
Babaioff, Lucier, Nisan, Paes Leme. EC'14
-
On the Construction of Substitutes
Balkanski, Paes Leme. MOR'20 (EC'18)
-
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?
Dobzinski, Feige, Feldman, Paes Leme. EC'21
-
Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla. FOCS'19
- Homework Policies:
-
- Students are encouraged to form groups of up to three people for each assignment. Each group needs to turn in only one solution, but every group member must be able to explain everything turned in.
- No late solutions will be accepted.
- Typesetting solutions using LaTex is encouraged.
-
If you do work with someone outside your group or use some outside source, you must acknowledge them in your write-up.
- Problem Sets
-
- Schedule:
-
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Sept 11: Introduction, Combinatorial Auctions, review of the VCG mechanism, Walrasian Tatonnement
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Sept 18: Gross subsitute valuations, Walrasian equilibria, welfare theorems
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Oct 2: No lecture (National day holiday)
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Sept 25: Configuration LP, demand oracles, submodular maximization subject to cardinality constraint
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Oct 9: